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“Forgetting is full of memory”
 – Mario Benedetti
Introduction
The field of memory has become a crucial topic of inquiry across academic 
disciplines and social discourses in recent years. Andreas Huyssen has 
referred to the widespread ‘obsession with memory and fear of forgetting’ 
in our contemporary globalized culture.1 The current preoccupation with 
collective memories across the globe and the parallel proliferation of critical 
discourses about the social processes of coming to terms with the collective 
past, appear symptomatic of cultural anxieties resulting from the systemic 
transformations caused by forces of globalization. I would like to argue that 
this resurgence of memory in political, cultural and academic discourses in 
the age of globalization is not a mere coincidence, but is a direct consequence 
of globalization. As Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad have noted, 
the traditional spaces, channels and forms of collective memory are being 
transformed by, and in reaction to, the forces of globalization.2 Local and 
national spaces and processes of remembrance have not disappeared, but 
the global has now become the central stage for social and political actors, 
grassroots movements, and judicial activism. That is why it has become 
necessary, rephrasing Maurice Halbwachs’s conceptualization of the ‘social 
frames’ of memory, to examine the ‘global frames’ of memories.
 Early in 2010, the news of Spanish ‘star judge’ Baltasar Garzón being 
indicted by Spain’s High Court made the headlines of news media across 
the globe, and filled social networks, blogs, and websites of human rights 
organizations, grassroots groups and civic associations throughout cyberspace. 
Judge Garzón had started investigations into the human rights violations, 
atrocities and forced disappearances that occurred during the Spanish 
Civil War and the years of Franco dictatorship, following international 
legal principles ratified by Spain which covered ‘crimes against humanity’, 
until he was forced to stop by the National High Court. In one of several 
paradoxical ironies, Garzón had been accused of acting without jurisdiction 
in a lawsuit filed by far right organizations, including the Spanish fascist 
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party, the Falange, which is considered responsible for the largest number 
of atrocities committed during and after the Civil War.
 The overwhelming response in support of Judge Garzón was global, 
coming from heads of state, dignitaries, Nobel Prize winners, as well as 
NGOs, HROs and grassroots community groups across the world. The 
memories of those atrocities did not belong anymore to one single group 
or nation, but belonged to the larger transnational community. They were 
‘memories without borders’. In what follows I would like to examine the 
parallels and connections between the efforts to recover historical memory 
in post-dictatorial societies, the formation of transnational memories, and 
perhaps its future convergence in the emergence of universal jurisdiction.
Historical memory and forgetting in post-Franco Spain
The Spanish Transition from dictatorship to democracy has been often 
presented in both academic and media discourses as the paradigmatic model 
of a peaceful, successful transition, and rapid transformation into a modern 
democracy, as an exemplar for other nations coming out of dictatorial 
regimes, particularly in Latin America in the 1980s and in Eastern Europe 
in the 1990s.3 The experience of the Spanish Transition, the replacement of a 
dictatorial regime by a democracy without the violence of a war or revolution, 
was at the time, in the mid-1970s, practically without precedent in modern 
history. The other two political transitions taking place simultaneously in 
Southern Europe, in Portugal and Greece, were characterized by violent 
radicalization and the use of revolutionary force in the overthrow of the 
old regimes, through the direct intervention of the military in civil politics. 
The consolidation of democracy in both instances was delayed. The Spanish 
model of a peaceful transition negotiated among the political elites was 
a new strategy, a ‘transition through transaction’, which resulted in the 
relatively fast stabilization of the nascent democracy.4 At the same time it 
started a virtually unexplored process of decentralization of the nation-estate 
and political devolution, with the recognition of the internal multicultural 
and multilingual historical reality of Spain. These events made the Spanish 
Transition a successful example, if not a model, or at least an obligatory 
reference, for other post-dictatorial transitional processes.5
 In spite of the grand narrative of the Spanish Transition as an overwhelming 
success story, which in fact has become a foundational myth of Spanish 
modernity,6 there are some shortcomings inherent to the process of Spanish 
democracy which cultural critics and historians have noted in hindsight, in 
particular the way of dealing with the past, or perhaps, of not dealing with 
it.7 The politics of memory of the transition has been repeatedly described 
as the erasure and eradication of historical memory, and the forgetting and 
silencing of the past.8
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 While that perception is based on the official ‘pact of forgetting’ brokered 
by the political elites and is in general terms accurate, I would like to raise 
a few points for consideration of the role of memory during the Transition. 
One is that we should take into account the asymmetry of memories 
across the national geography. The atrophy of memory in the national 
political discourse was parallel to the recovery of historical memory in the 
peripheries of the nation-state, where local forms of sub-state nationalism 
relied heavily on a different collective memory. A major component of the 
recognition of cultural and ethnical difference of the so called ‘historical 
nationalities’ and their demands for political rights was historical memory. 
The emphasis however was not in reparations or backward-looking justice, 
but in the restoration of pre-civil war local institutions of government, and 
Statues of Autonomy for Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia, which had 
been cut short by Franco’s uprising against the Republic.
 The second point is that the relationship between memory and forgetting 
is not a simple either-or phenomenon, since memory always necessarily 
involves forgetting, and ‘forgetting is full of memory’, as the Uruguayan 
writer Mario Benedetti has stated.9 As a corollary of that, I would argue 
that historical memory did not completely evaporate during the Transition; it 
may have disappeared from the surface of political debates but left noticeable 
traces and remained operative in other areas on the margins of power. 
Memory was exiled from institutional political discourse, and displaced to 
the intellectual and cultural arena. There it found a distinctive space, as 
attested by the explosion in the early years of the transition 1976-1978 of 
literature, documentaries and films, and historical and testimonial accounts 
dealing with the recent past, and the wide public recognition of those works.10 
The fact that these works became popular best-sellers and box-office hits, 
receiving the most important literary prizes in Spain, such as the Planeta 
and Anagrama, indicates that historical memory still resonated strongly with 
large segments of the Spanish public, no matter what the political elites 
had decided behind closed doors, and that a significant memory void still 
needed to be filled.
 A third point: As Paloma Aguilar has argued, the memory of the past was 
not only present but constituted a key factor in the particular development 
of the Spanish political transition, but as a negative force.11 The haunting 
of the past was behind the calculated policy of not re-opening of old 
wounds, to avoid the repetition of national confrontation and violence. The 
fear of destabilization and potential repetition of a civil war conflict acted 
as deterrents against a direct confrontation with the past, since that past 
was considered highly divisive. The traumatic memories of the horrors 
and atrocities of the Civil War were constant reminders of the potential 
dangers of a violent re-enactment of the past, and influenced the collective 
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will against seeing its repetition, and therefore acted as incentive towards 
a politics of consensus.
 If one of the fundamental lessons learned from historical memory is the 
avoidance of the repetition of the mistakes of the past, it can be argued that 
the process of the Spanish Transition had learned important lessons from its 
past, as well as of its neighbours, and therefore we should consider that the 
memory of the past may have had a more important role in the transitional 
process than is generally credited.
 Also, I would like to add another correction to the standard and official 
narrative of the exemplary Spanish Transition: although it is generally 
remembered as a peaceful process, and as the victory of consensus and 
moderation over confrontation, the first crucial years of political changes 
took place in a climate of violence and the threat of political involution did 
not dissipate until the 1980s. These violent challenges to the process came 
from small minority sectors on both extremes of the political spectrum: 
those directly associated ideologically with Franco’s regime (extreme right 
terrorist groups and the un-purged military hierarchies), and from extreme 
left terrorist organizations such as GRAPO and ETA. But violence also often 
came from the abusive force of the police, and as it would be later revealed, 
from secret anti-terrorist state terror.12 More than 400 individuals died as 
a result of political violence in the years of the Transition, the majority at 
the hands of ETA; and more than 60 died in street demonstrations. The 
official narrative of the Spanish Transition forgets the violence and intensity 
of conflicts, and the real possibility of a successful coup (several were 
attempted, most famously the failed attack on Congress in February 23, 
1981).13 But this violent reality had a profound effect on the way of dealing 
with the past.
 In an effort to make progress with the democratic reform and the 
stabilization of the new democracy, the political elites, both the regime 
reformists and the main leaders of the anti-Franco opposition, agreed, to 
use the discourse of the times, not to ‘reopen the old wounds of the past’, 
to ‘turn the page’, and focus on the task of building the future, in what 
became known as the collective ‘pact of forgetting’, or pact of silence about 
the past.
 In this negotiation, a performance of symbolic reconciliation of the 
elites, everyone conceded: the system reformists accepted the dissolution 
of the old regime, the full democratization of the state, the legalization of 
political parties and release of political prisoners. The leftist anti-Franco 
opposition sacrificed the memory of repression and suffering in its 40-year 
collective struggle, reversed their long-standing republicanism and accepted 
the legitimacy of the monarchy and parliamentarian liberalism, in exchange 
for freedom and democracy.
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 As a result, historical memory was institutionally disavowed; it was 
problematic, messy, dangerous, and did not benefit the principal actors of the 
emerging democracy. Both sides had skeletons in the closet, and everybody 
had something to lose. It was not considered appropriate to remember that 
the majority of the players on the right and centre of the political spectrum, 
and particularly those of the UCD party in government between 1977 and 
1982, had started their careers as part of Franco’s last administrations, such 
as Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez. For the main national parties of the left, the 
socialists and communists, the past was also inconvenient. Their legalization 
by the government was the result of a tacit agreement that they would not 
seek reparations. It was also in their best interest not to revisit the murky 
political responsibilities for the atrocities committed on the Republican 
side during the Civil War. They had already paid collectively 40 years of 
repression and exile. Historical memory became thus a political taboo in 
Spanish political culture.14
 The pact not to deal with the crimes of political nature committed during 
the Spanish Civil War and its aftermath would result in the Amnesty Law 
of October 1977, by which the newly elected representatives agreed on a 
general amnesty for all political motivated crimes committed since 1936 
(with the only exception of the right wing minority group, Alianza Popular, 
which refused pardoning the political crimes of the left). It should be 
remembered, however, that the main expressed goals behind the Amnesty 
Law approved was to officially pardon all of Franco’s opponents – past 
political prisoners and exiles – and to put an end to the judicial proceedings 
of those involved in political struggle, and thus to bring closure to the process 
of repression. Most Spaniards at the time did not realize that, in actuality, 
the law also included two articles barring the prosecution of all political 
crimes committed since the Spanish Civil War on Franco’s side, including 
post-war atrocities, forced disappearances, mass killings, and torture, all 
classified as ‘crimes against humanity’ by international law. This fact did 
not receive the attention of the general media, which focused instead on the 
more pressing issues of the liberation and integration of political prisoners 
and the process of national reconciliation.15 A 1977 editorial from influential 
daily El País summarized the general consensus: ‘A people cannot and must 
not lack historical memory: but the latter must serve to encourage projects 
for peaceful future coexistence rather than promote rancour about the 
past’.16 A result of the Amnesty Law was that not only were those crimes 
never punished, they were not even investigated, and the victims did not 
receive justice and appropriate reparation (although gradual reparations were 
subsequently implemented through the years).
 While it can be argued that the amnesty policy was effective in stabilizing 
an emerging and fragile democracy, and perhaps it was an inevitable measure 
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in the context of an extremely challenging political and economic climate, 
in retrospect it is clear that it created a severe ethical deficit. More than a 
process of active reconciliation, perhaps impossible to achieve at the time 
given the powerful presence of the old cadres in the military, the repressive 
forces, and the judicial structures, it was a disavowal of the past and the legal 
basis for institutional forgetting. In that sense, political amnesty equalled 
historical amnesia.
 But some additional context is required to understand this particular 
development, since both the internal social pressures and the international 
environment were looking in a different direction. Although fundamentally a 
top-down project modelled by political elites, backward-looking justice and 
accountability were not a high priority in Spanish society as a whole, and 
were not part of the international climate either. The main social demands 
in Spain at the time were freedom, democracy, peace, and stability, with 
the addition of devolution aspirations from the peripheral nationalisms 
(especially Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia).17 The Civil War 
and the worst atrocities in its aftermath had happened forty years earlier, 
and the large majority of the Spanish population, 70%, had had no direct 
experience of it, but only through indirect inherited memories or ‘post-
memories’ (a concept borrowed from Marianne Hirsch’s study of Holocaust 
victim descendants).18 After forty years of severe repression, and the official 
erasure of conflicting memories of the past, Spanish society was largely 
depolarized and lacking in historical memory. In essence, there were no 
channels for public remembering and little collective desire to remember 
either.19 Spanish society embraced the new liberties and the experience of 
modernity without much interest in remembering the sordid past, on the 
contrary, it actively tried to disassociate from this past very rapidly. The 
generational change would set off the emergence of the Movida and its 
intense live-the-moment, forget-about-the-past attitude, which would be an 
illustrative result of this phenomenon. It is also not surprising that a key 
symbolic figure who reappears forcefully in the cultural narratives of the 
Transition and the Movida years is the transsexual/transvestite, an ambiguous 
figure who embodies a past that needs to be forgotten, and a present that 
is constructed as a series of continuous acts of performance.20
 I should add that although the main factors of transitional processes 
are internal to the nation, the international historical context can play a 
very significant role. The international climate in the mid-1970s as a result 
of Cold War politics had more tolerance for undemocratic regimes, and 
less interest in persecuting human rights violations.21 There was no strong 
international pressure for accountability, human rights organizations were not 
fully developed, and the battle against impunity was not a major motivation, 
as would be the case in the 1980s and 1990s.
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 In this climate of collective forgetting, cultural critics have referred to a 
‘crisis of memory’, and different interpretative models have been employed 
(psychoanalytical, trauma, repression, melancholia, mourning, spectral 
‘hauntology’ of the past). While many Spanish writers, artists and film 
directors have grappled with these issues in their works, they all point to 
a large void in the Spanish collective memory. Thousands of victims of 
Franco’s brutal repression remained forgotten, or unknown. To the new 
generations of Spaniards, Franco was soon just as forgotten and irrelevant 
as Napoleon, dismissed as inconsequential for the present, and the atrocities 
committed during and after the Spanish Civil War were largely ignored. 
Official school programmes and textbooks hardly made any references to the 
war or the dictatorship, and the Valley of the Fallen, the colossal mausoleum 
erected by Franco as a war memorial of the victorious side, and constructed 
with the forced labour of 20,000 Republican political prisoners, is regularly 
visited by thousands of tourists, unaware of its dark history which is not 
mentioned by the official guides. This ethical deficit has been summed up 
by Spanish writer Almudena Grandes: ‘The democratic transition was a 
success from the point of view of institutions because it allowed the most 
solid democratic period enjoyed by the country. Yet, from a moral point of 
view, it was not a success because a generation later we Spaniards cannot 
accept the deficit of that process’.22
Transatlantic mirrors and asymmetries
So can we still talk about a ‘model’ transition, and its application to other 
transitional processes? The idea of the model, implanted and replicated in 
other countries, is highly problematic, and ultimately probably false. The 
internal dynamics of each country are very different, and there is a general 
agreement that, although international factors can be significant determinants, 
it is above all internal factors that determine the process of a democratic 
transition. Also, all the efforts of ‘exporting democracy’ have met with 
relative failure when not huge disaster, as we have witnessed in recent 
years. So, we should not see the Spanish Transition as a model handbook, 
but as a reference, from which lessons, both positive and negative, could be 
learned. Ultimately, rather than the single exemplary model with different 
applications, it would be potentially more instructive to see a plurality of 
different national examples and experiences, acting as potential mirrors, 
where each one of the participants has looked and learned from each other 
different ways of dealing with the past, in a sort of transatlantic boomerang 
effect. I would like to point out several transnational connections which 
would support this theory of mirrors and rebound effects.
 Firstly, the disappearance of Franco’s regime, which had been if not 
exactly a model, at least an important reference point for Latin American 
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military dictators, from Trujillo in the Dominican Republic to Pinochet 
in Chile. Seeing the dismantling of the dictatorship and Spain’s overall 
successful transformation into a democratic society was a sign of hope 
and encouragement for those seeking the return of democracy in Latin 
American countries. Spain became also a major refuge for many political 
exiles from the Southern Cone, in a boomerang reversal of the massive 
Spanish Republican Diaspora after the Civil War. As a result, valuable 
transnational cultural connections were established, and mutual learning was 
attained through actions of solidarity, practices of resistance and experiential 
exchanges about ways of dealing with the past.23 Collective memories were 
shared and new memories were made.
 Secondly, the Spanish transition experimented with new political strategies, 
the route of political reform through peaceful negotiation, rather than violent 
overthrown or revolutionary action. This would be the general roadmap 
followed in most Latin American political transition processes, negotiated 
transitions, where reform by political force was chosen over rupture. This 
commonality of experience explains the frequent use of a common lexicon: 
transition, pact, historical memory, and desencanto (disillusionment with 
unfulfilled dreams and expectations); these are recurring concepts in the 
historical and cultural narratives of the Spanish and Latin American post-
dictatorships which indicate the existence of shared memory discourses.
 But there are also important differences. The Latin American transitions of 
the Southern Cone employed new forms of social action, and adopted a new 
language of human rights, which were initially absent in the Spanish case. In 
essence, the Latin American transitions introduce new forms of dealing with 
the past: through the establishment of truth commissions, official reports, 
and judiciary tribunals to investigate, document, and prosecute the human 
rights violations of the past (the first was CONADEP in Argentina in 1983). 
This phenomenon is perhaps the most significant difference with respect to 
the Spanish Transition. As we have seen, in the Spanish case, there was a 
significant lack of trials, truth tribunals, and other acts of investigation and 
retribution in dealing with the past. In sharp contrast, thousands of cases 
of forced disappearances and other crimes against basic human rights were 
documented in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Chile, and a few made it 
into the court system. In many of those cases, however, those early efforts 
would bring few successes, and, like in Spain, eventually would be excluded 
from prosecution due to different amnesty decrees passed, and newly enacted 
Laws of Full Stop and Due Obedience, as a result of the pressures of the 
military and the changing political climate, such as the presidential pardon by 
Carlos Menem in Argentina in 1990 (later annulled in 2005, which allowed 
the successful prosecution of formerly pardoned military personnel).
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 There were also new social actors at work in the Latin American 
transitions thanks to grassroots mobilization, and thus, the important role 
of human rights organizations, indigenous community movements, and 
associations of families of victims, such as the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, 
a non-partisan political organization that would obtain world-wide recognition 
and would serve as example for other human rights civic associations in 
different countries, including Spain.
 There was also a new vocabulary: foremost ‘desaparecidos’ (allegedly first 
used in Guatemala in 1966, but infamously employed by the Argentinean 
armed forces, and subsequently adopted by human rights organizations and 
victim associations).24 The concept of desaparecido, or ‘forced disappearance’, 
gained wide international acceptance in discussions of human rights, and 
moving across borders, eventually would be employed retroactively in the 
Spanish context. Thus, a double time-space displacement occurred, by which 
a concept of the second part of the twentieth century imported from Latin 
America is applied retrospectively to events of the first half of the twentieth 
century in Spain.
 Although most scholars agree that it is internal tensions and agents that 
are of primary importance in transition processes, regional, transnational 
and international influences also play a role. I would like to underline the 
different international time-space contexts: the 1970s Cold War and the 1990s 
post-collapse of the Soviet Bloc, which both carry different international 
implications and solutions. Spain’s closer proximity to other established 
European democracies and the assistance received from European political 
institutions, parties, unions, etc., facilitated the peaceful transition, and 
assisted with the rapid process of political and economical stabilization. 
The Cold War international setting did not favour accountability measures 
and human rights efforts. By the mid and late 1980s, the obsolescence of 
dictatorships was beginning to be widely recognized, as the example of the 
Iberian transitions had shown. The new international situation, with the crisis 
and breakdown of the Soviet bloc, and the end of the Cold War, acted as a 
catalyst to re-open the past (to learn what had happened in Eastern Europe) 
and this facilitated the human rights efforts.25 The war of the Balkans and 
the genocide in Rwanda in the early 1990s were also major boosts to human 
rights awareness and plans to action on a global scale that did not exist 
earlier. This would determine the creation of UN directed supranational 
tribunals specifically designed to deal with the atrocities committed in 
both countries, which were important precedents for the implementation of 
universal jurisdiction. The Latin American transitions were influenced by 
this new international climate to re-open the past and demand justice. In 
this context, the question arises: Did these events affect the way of dealing 
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with the past in Spain, and how? Or did it all come too late in the Spanish 
case?
Judge Garzón and the globalization of justice
In the last years of the twentieth century a new global paradigm emerged. The 
end of the Cold War era opened the possibility of establishing international 
jurisdiction, a concept that appeared after WWII but had been dormant 
since the Nuremberg trials. Several elements came together unexpectedly: 
The fact that there was a certain vacuum in the international enforcement 
of human rights violations, and the particularity of the Spanish legal system 
which grants investigative powers to judges, and a ‘universal jurisdiction’ 
statute that allows ‘crimes against humanity’ to be tried in Spanish courts 
independent of where they took place (which was changed in 2009, now 
only admitting cases when Spanish citizens are involved). The international 
climate, and the uniqueness of the Spanish legal system, made Spain one 
of the few places where human rights crimes committed anywhere in the 
world could be heard in a court of law, which explains the emergence in 
the international arena of the figure of Baltasar Garzón, the well-known 
Judge from Spain’s High Court, specialized in high-profile cases of national 
and international magnitude. That and, of course, the relentless drive and 
personality of the Spanish magistrate.
 Judge Garzón remains a highly controversial figure at home, while 
widely recognized as a champion of the fight for human rights around the 
world, and a major proponent of the concept of ‘universal jurisdiction’.26 
His judicial crusades against organized crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, 
state crimes, and in favour of victims of political violence and the rights of 
indigenous peoples, have been widely recognized. Also well known is his 
involvement in the establishment of legal grounds for the trial of crimes 
against humanity in Latin America, particularly in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, 
Peru and Guatemala.
 Judge Garzón’s international standing and reputation as a human rights 
crusader gained greater prominence and visibility with the 1998 indictment 
against ex-dictator Augusto Pinochet. Indeed, a historical precedent was set 
when Garzón requested Pinochet’s extradition to Spain to stand trial for 
human rights abuses, during a medical visit in the UK. The House of Lords 
admitted the request, based on the principle of international jurisdiction, and 
he remained under arrest for 16 months. The case received wide coverage 
across the world as a first test of the transnational application of universal 
principles of crimes against humanity to one of its most notorious figures, 
generally considered untouchable. Human rights organizations, victim 
associations, and the political left in Chile, as throughout Latin America 
and many other parts of the world, celebrated the extradition.27 Conservative 
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sectors were generally displeased, the Chilean government was embarrassed, 
and so was the Spanish one, led by conservative leader José María Aznar, 
who thought the case could affect Spanish economic interests in Latin 
America. Although eventually the case was dismissed for ‘medical reasons’, 
it is generally acknowledged that it represented a major step forward in the 
implementation of the concept of universal jurisdiction and the efforts to fight 
cases against human rights violations worldwide. Dictators were not immune 
to prosecution, national amnesty decrees did not protect with impunity those 
who committed crimes against humanity, and human rights principles of 
international jurisdiction could be implemented transnationally.
 The effects of Garzón’s indictment of Pinochet, legally and symbolically, 
directly and indirectly, cannot be underestimated. It gave renewed impetus 
to HROs and the efforts to undertake accountability processes in Latin 
America, enabling the re-opening of stalled investigations and trials, and 
served as precedent for many new cases that were filed in Spain and other 
countries.28 Culminating in prosecution efforts against Argentina’s human 
rights violations, on April 2005, Spain’s High Court condemned Argentinean 
Junta leader Adolfo Scilingo to a 640-year prison sentence. And, yet, in spite 
of these accountability measures, neither Chile nor Argentina fell apart.
 In addition, the process offered the opportunity to prosecutors, HROs, 
NGOs, victim and civil associations across geopolitical borders, to learn from 
each other’s successes and failures and to influence or supplement institutional 
measures. As Roht-Arriaza has commented, ‘[t]he transnationalization of 
human rights activist networks, and the flow of knowledge through those 
networks, have allowed different countries to learn from one another’.29 The 
currents of globalization can be instrumentalized by progressive forces and 
affect the political elites, as Assmann and Conrad have stated: ‘[T]he values 
of counter-globalization have invaded the hegemonic memory constructs 
of the nation-state and they have reasserted claims to moral comport and 
accountability’.30 Peripheral counter-memories have thus come to occupy a 
central position in national and international political debates and social 
processes.
 These types of international and transnational experiences with 
accountability processes have also proved valuable for reparation measures, 
and the establishment of truth commissions. The Chilean model of dealing 
with the past was created in large measure from the lessons of its neighbours, 
going beyond Uruguay (who did relatively little) but falling short of Argentina 
(who did a lot more, but the process backfired). This experience in turn 
influenced the transition process in South Africa, with some modifications 
(including public hearings and reports, and no amnesty law passed).
 As the study of these ‘global frames’ of memory indicate, a complex 
network of national and transnational groups, civic and institutional 
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organizations, have been instrumental in the establishing of basic principles 
of universal jurisdiction. Supranational institutions (such as the UN, the 
UE or the OAS) have generated human rights ordinances and treaties that 
create obligations for individual signatory countries, and these provisions 
have been used in court in individual countries. The UK and Chile had 
signed the Anti-Torture Treaty in 1988, and therefore the Pinochet case was 
accepted for torture crimes committed after that date. Recent international 
law ruled that crimes of forced kidnapping and disappearance are considered 
on-going violations committed in the present for as long as the victim 
remains disappeared, which in essence annuls the statue of limitations 
and opens the door for the prosecution of many human rights violations.31 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) determined 
that amnesties in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina and El Salvador violate the 
principles of ACHR, and these allegations have been employed as judicial 
argumentation to reinitiate investigations. Similar cases have occurred in 
reference to other international provisions, with mixed results (some have 
produced confirmed sentences, but many have been thrown out of court).
And the boomerang returns home . . .
Several paradoxical ironies and asymmetries emerge from this narrative. 
While a Spanish judge was able to bring to trial criminals accused of crimes 
against humanity committed beyond the national borders, the war crimes, 
atrocities, tortures, mass executions, political persecution that occurred during 
the Civil War and the dictatorship on Spanish soil remained unexamined. 
There is something fundamentally odd in the picture of Spanish courts 
pursuing human right abuses committed by foreign dictators, while they have 
been unable to investigate the much larger number of atrocities committed 
in their own land. This realization has not escaped the attention of many 
intellectuals, writers, journalists and cultural critics in Spain who have been 
relentlessly demanding the ‘recovery of historical memory’.32
 It was at the turn of the millennium, during the conservative government 
of the Partido Popular (1996-2004), that grassroots community associations, 
non-governmental groups, and activists emerged with great force demanding 
a solution to this ‘crisis of memory’ in Spain. Different sectors of Spanish 
society mobilized around the common goal of unearthing the past, which had 
literally been buried under Franco’s regime and symbolically reburied during 
the Transition. Because of the government’s lack of interest in pursuing 
investigations, the work relied on the efforts of civic associations, NGOs, 
and leftist political organizations, such as Izquierda Unida. Community 
groups and family of victim associations started forming with the idea 
of reclaiming the identification of victims of Franco’s repression and the 
recovery of the remains of their family members, disappeared and buried 
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in unnamed mass graves across the land. These groups largely followed the 
example of grassroots movements and civic associations in Latin America 
on the margins of traditional power structures (the Mothers of Plaza de 
Mayo, in particular).
 The creation in 2000 of the Asociación para la recuperación de la 
memoria histórica (ARMH), the Association for the Recovery of Historical 
Memory, was followed by a myriad of other civic associations across the 
land, many organized within the Federación de foros por la Memoria 
(Federation of Forums for Memory), which have placed memory back in 
the centre of Spanish political life in recent years. Their claims struck a 
chord with Spanish society, slowly waking up to the reality of a brutal past 
of repression, which had been itself repressed. The ARMH website logo 
captures the emotional side of repressed collective memories: ‘Why did the 
fathers of the Constitution leave my grandfather in a ditch?’33 Thousands of 
unmarked burial sites in ditches along the roads still remain in the Spanish 
landscape, invisible but ever present, just like ghosts still awaiting their day 
of justice. The liminal and invisible position is an adequate metaphor of 
their non-existing status in the margins of the official history. Internationally 
the best known of those victims still disappeared is the mythical figure of 
Federico García Lorca, a symbolic martyr of the Spanish fascist uprising, 
assassinated in the first weeks of the Civil War and still unaccounted for. 
Like a ghost, Lorca’s shadow is a powerful reminder of the unsettled nature 
of the past and historical memory, still waiting recovery, resolution, and 
reparation.
 In addition to these efforts, new investigations undertaken after the 
opening of official military archives to historians and documentarians 
revealed the existence of large numbers of concentration camps, where 
atrocities were committed on a large scale with absolute impunity. Several 
best-selling historical novels published in recent years such as Manuel 
Rivas’s The Carpenter’s Pencil, Javier Cercas’s Soldiers of Salamis, Dulce 
Chacón’s The Sleeping Voice and Jesús Ferrero’s The Thirteen Roses, all 
of which have been adapted to the big screen, have given depth of emotion 
and further explored the extent of political crimes during the war and its 
aftermath for large audiences.34
 This multiplicity of events lead to the new Socialist Government which 
came to power in 2004 to establish a special Interministerial Commission for 
the Study of the Situation of Civil War Victims (Comisión Interministerial 
para el Estudio de la Situación de las Víctimas de la Guerra Civil), 
presided over by the Deputy Prime Minister, in the spirit of the Investigative 
Commissions that had been formed in many Latin American countries 
earlier. The Spanish parliament declared 2006 as the ‘Year of Memory’, and 
subsequently passed in 2007 the ‘Law of Historical Memory’. This highly 
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contested law, insufficient for some on the left, unnecessary for many on the 
right, officially declared illegitimate and radically unjust the legal practices 
and acts of violence used by Franco’s regime against its political enemies. 
It gave reparations to the victims of political persecution and their families, 
and eliminated the presence of political symbols and street names associated 
with Franco and his regime in all public places. It also banned pro-Franco 
political rallies at the Valley of the Fallen, where Falange supporters have 
usually gathered around Franco’s tomb. It was also the expressed mandate 
of the Law that local courts would assist with and facilitate the recovery 
and identification of disappeared victims of the repression, among other 
provisions. Although late, and imperfect for some, the new law was a major 
victory for the families of the victims.
 We are now coming back full circle to the beginning. Several associations 
of victims filed a suit requiring a full investigation into several mass graves 
with victims of Franco’s political violence. In September 2008, Judge Garzón 
started preliminary general investigations of all the disappearances occurred 
during the Spanish Civil War and post-war dictatorship, reaching an estimate 
of 114,000 victims. In October 2008, he assumed the investigation of forced 
disappearances and mass executions, in what would be known as ‘the case 
against the crimes of Francoism’. He ordered the excavation of 19 mass 
graves, including two highly symbolic ones: one, in the Valley of the Fallen, 
Franco’s own mausoleum where thousands of unknown Republican soldiers 
were buried, and one in Granada, where García Lorca remains were thought 
to lie. Garzón requested the death certificates of the alleged perpetrators 
in a move that was seen by many as trying to determine responsibilities. 
The investigative process was initiated, and mass graves were dug, with 
the Partido Popular vociferously opposed to the ‘reopening the wounds of 
the past’, and the strong opposition of conservative sectors of the media, 
judicial bodies and the Catholic Church. The investigations and excavations 
were interrupted when the prosecutor’s office and the Criminal Branch of 
the National High Court, with a conservative majority, decreed that Garzón 
did not have jurisdiction on the matter and the investigations were forced 
to stop. A month later, Garzón recused himself from the case, and let the 
local courts proceed with the investigations. Since then, local courts and 
governments, particularly those where the Partido Popular is in power, have 
been passive-resistant to the efforts in the recovery of victim remains, so 
it has been again up to the civic associations to do the job on their own, 
with subsidies provided by the state government from provisions under the 
Law of Historical Memory. The digging up of mass graves has continued 
across the national landscape, 2000 mass burial sites have been located so 
far, and more than 3000 individual victims identified and properly buried, 
thus bringing at last some form of closure to many.
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 But that’s not quite the end. Three far right political groups associated 
with the old regime, including the Falange, the Spanish fascist party, filed 
a suit against Garzón for ‘prevaricación’ (lack of jurisdiction), based on a 
technicality, the discrete competence of lower courts versus the national 
High Court, and the existence of the 1977 amnesty law. A variety of long 
time political and personal vendettas against Garzón, including rivalries 
with far-right judges, did the rest, with the result that the Spanish General 
Council of the Judiciary suspended Garzón from court on May 14, 2010, 
after his indictment for lack of jurisdiction. The judge subsequently requested 
a leave from the court and accepted a special consultant position at the 
International Crime Court in The Hague, the highest tribunal established 
on the premises of universal jurisdiction. For Emilio Silva, the president 
of ARMH, this move has the symbolism of a political refugee seeking 
asylum away from his homeland, and he has described Garzón as ‘the last 
of Franco’s exiles’.35
 The case against Garzón made the headlines of news media around the 
world, just like many of the cases he had overseen had done before. Massive 
demonstrations in Spain, and international shows of support followed. One 
Catalan collective issued a manifesto of support precisely entitled ‘For a 
Memory Without Borders’, which has been signed by thousands around the 
world. The darkly ironic paradoxes surrounding this case have not gone 
unnoticed. While his work has been applauded by international observers, 
politicians, human rights activists and the world media at large, at home 
he has been vilified and been the target of continued attacks in what, for 
some, has been the most shameful act of recent Spanish history. For many, 
at home and abroad, it was more than just the chastising of one individual 
judge, but a collective slap in the face of all the victims. As one devastated 
family member of a victim said upon hearing the indictment, ‘it feels as if 
they have won the war all over again’.36 For most, is it incomprehensible that 
the judge who listened to and facilitated the demands of many seeking truth 
and justice for their disappeared family members, would find himself sitting 
in the bench of the accused, on account of a suit filed by the Spanish Fascist 
party directly responsible for the largest number of atrocities committed 
during and after the war. Human Rights Watch representative Reed Brody 
denounced the ‘double standard’ of Spanish justice system, which investigated 
the Argentinean and Chilean dictatorships, but indicted a Spanish judge for 
doing the same with the Spanish dictatorship.37 In another boomerang effect, 
a group of Galician immigrants from Argentina filed a suit in Buenos Aires 
to re-open the case against the human rights violations of the Franco regime. 
Nora Cortiñas, a member of the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, noted the 
symbolic implications of this case, as a way of repaying Spain in kind for 
the earlier opening of investigations about the desaparecidos in Argentina 
in Spanish courts.38
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 The Garzón case has ultimately meant the return of the repressed with 
full force, the haunting of the ghosts of the past improperly buried, and 
has confirmed the unfinished business of the Spanish Transition, especially 
when seen in contrast with all the transnational efforts to promote historical 
memory, human rights, and backward looking accountability around the 
world. In a certain way, it was fitting that Garzón’s own case would become 
the centre of international attention, and a precedent-seeking trial, as many 
see it as the ultimate test of universal jurisdiction in the fight against human 
rights abuses. Peruvian lawyer Roland Gamarra, who successfully prosecuted 
former Peruvian president Roberto Fujimori for authorizing a civilian 
massacre that killed 15 people, in spite of an amnesty law, has acknowledged 
that the case ‘is transcendent for those of us fighting against impunity, and 
is more relevant still because the accused is an iconic magistrate’.39 Gamarra 
will participate in the trial as a witness to the fact
that a current of legal interpretation exists, based on the expansion of 
International Criminal Law, which favours the persecution of those 
crimes committed in the context of crimes against humanity, despite the 
time passed since they were perpetrated and above the so-called laws of 
pardon . . . The international laws protect judge Garzón to investigate 
the crimes of the Franco era.40
Garzón himself has recognized the global implications and the opportunity 
that his own trial would put those theories to the test:
The defence that my attorney proposes to develop will be based on the 
fact that the decisions I took are protected by the rules of International 
Criminal Law commonly accepted by civilised nations and collected in 
the various treaties Spain has signed. . . . They are the rules that require 
us to give protection at all times to the victims of forced disappearance, 
that consider crimes against humanity unpardonable, and that proscribe 
the laws of pardon to the extent that they impede persecution of crimes 
against humanity or genocide.41
The UN Human Rights Committee has criticized Spain for having such high 
number of still unidentified victims illegally buried in mass graves, and has 
stated that crimes against humanity such as the ones Garzón was trying 
to investigate are not subject to criminal prescription and therefore cannot 
be subject to amnesty nor pardon. These arguments have been presented 
by international jurists, academics, and human rights defendants across the 
world in an open letter to the Spanish Supreme Court, but their eventual 
effect still remains unknown.42
 Ultimately, Garzón’s quixotic quest for reparation of injustices and crimes 
against humanity around the globe illustrates the possibilities raised, as well 
as the challenges presented, towards the goal of universal jurisdiction and 
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the eradication of impunity by the competing forces of individual nation-
states, transnational grassroots networks, and supranational organizations 
in the new global dynamics. But it also suggests the existence of networks 
of memory without borders, and the potential of those memories to make 
an impact on the global stage and change the future. As former Director 
General of UNESCO Federico Mayor Zaragoza has written:
The truth of exactly what happened must be revealed, without limitations. 
. . . Only through this collective memory, with a profound knowledge of 
the past, will we be capable of building the appropriate future for our 
common destiny. . . . And we can only do so with memories without 
borders, with justice without borders.43
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